

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LUXEMB 00572 01 OF 02 021614Z

53

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AID-20 EB-11 NSC-10 RSC-01 CIEP-02

TRSE-00 SS-15 STR-08 OMB-01 CEA-02 L-03 H-03 PA-03

PRS-01 USIA-15 CIAE-00 COME-00 FRB-02 INR-10 NSAE-00

LAB-06 SIL-01 EA-11 SAJ-01 XMB-07 OPIC-12 IO-13 TAR-02

NIC-01 PM-07 NEA-10 MBFR-03 DODE-00 RSR-01 /208 W

----- 121421

R 021430Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3509

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS UNN

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LUXEMBOURG 0572

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EC, COMECON, LU

SUBJECT: COMECON-EC CONTACTS

REF: BRUSSELS 4290; BRUSSELS 4414; MOSCOW 9047;  
COPENHAGEN 1787

1. WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THORN AWAY ON HOLIDAYS, I  
CALLED ON AUGUST 1 ON PAUL HELMINGER, POLITICAL OFFICER  
IN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED  
THORN ON HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW, TO ASCERTAIN WHAT HAD  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LUXEMB 00572 01 OF 02 021614Z

TRANSPIRED ON QUESTION OF EC-COMECON RELATIONS.

2. THORN BEGAN DISCUSSION WITH KOSYGIN BY MAKING GENERAL OBSERVATION THAT SINCE COMMUNITY WAS ENTERING ECONOMIC DISCUSSION WITH ASSOCIATED STATES AS WELL AS U.S. AND OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND WAS ON VERGE OF ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH PRC, IT WAS STRANGE THAT EC HAD NO FORMAL RELATIONS WITH LARGEST EUROPEAN COUNTRY (USSR).

3. HELMINGER SAID THAT THORN WAS TAKEN BACK WHEN, IN RESPONSE, KOSYGIN TOLD HIM THAT COMECON COUNTRIES HAD DECIDED AT RECENT PRAGUE MEETING TO INITIATE CONTACTS WITH EC USING COMECON AS INTERMEDIARY. KOSYGIN SAID THAT GROMYKO HAD BEEN MANDATED TO HAVE PRELIMINARY CONTACTS WITH PRESIDENT OF EC COUNCIL, DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDERSON TO FIND OUT WHETHER FADEYEV COULD ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACTS WITH ANDERSON. HELMINGER EMPHASIZED IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD IN MIND DIRECT EC-COMECON RELATIONS OR SIMPLY USING COMECON AS A VEHICLE FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND INDIVIDUAL EASTERN STATES. KOSYGIN EXPLAINED THAT GROMYKO HAD MADE THIS APPROACH TO ANDERSON DURING FIRST STAGE OF CSCE IN HELSINKI. SOVIETS WANTED TO ASCERTAIN FROM THORN EC REACTION TO COMECON INITIATIVE DURING EC JULY 23-24 MINISTERIAL MEETING AT COPENHAGEN.

4. SOVIETS WERE SURPRISED WHEN THORN SNASWERED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT HE HAD HEARD OF THIS INTERESTING INITIATIVE. SOVIET OFFICIALS FROM KOSYGIN AND GROMYKO ON DOWN THEN EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF THIS INITIATIVE AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THORN WOULD GET THE MESSAGE AND TRANSMIT IT TO OTHER EC COUNTRIES. RELATIONS SHOULD ENCOMPASS TARIFFS, QUOTAS, MONETARY AREAS, AS WELL AS INVESTMENT CODES. ON INVESTMENT QUESTION, KOSYGIN WAS PARTICULARLY INSISTENT POINTING OUT THAT USSR WAS NOW AN ATTRACTIVE PLACE FOR INVESTMENT.

5. Y.V. DUBININ, HEAD OF FIRST EUROPEAN DIRECTORATE IN SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY, THEN SOUGHT OUT LUXEMBOURG AMBASSADOR TO USSR, ADRIAN MEISCH, TO EMPHASIZE IMPOR-  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LUXEMB 00572 01 OF 02 021614Z

TANCE SOVIETS ATTACH TO DECISION BY COMECON COUNTRIES TO SEEK CONTACTS WITH EC. HE DID EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THAT ANY MULTILATERAL MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD NOT BE EXCLUSIVE, AND EXCLUDE BILATERAL CONTACTS.

6. THORN TOLD SOVIETS THAT THEIR INITIATIVE WAS INTERESTING BUT ONE MUST BEAR IN MIND BOTH THE RELATIVE POWER OF BOTH ORGANIZATIONS AND IMPORTANCE OF NOT EXCLUDING

BILATERAL CONTACTS BY EITHER INDIVIDUAL EC OR INDIVIDUAL COMECON COUNTRIES.

7. ACCORDING TO HELMINGER, JOBERT, WHO ARRIVED IN MOSCOW ONE DAY AFTER THORN, WAS SOMEWHAT UPSET THAT SOVIETS DID NOT BRING UP MATTER FIRST WITH HIM. JOBERT QUESTIONED THORN ON SUBJECT OF COMECON CONTACT WITH EC WHEN THEY HAD AN UNSCHEDULED MEETING IN MOSCOW. SOVIETS SAID NOTHING TO JOBERT ON MATTER UNTIL FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER BROUGHT IT UP WITH BREZHNEV. BREZHNEV THEN CONFIRMED THORN'S REPORT IN ALL DETAILS. BREZHNEV ALSO TOLD JOBERT THAT REASON WHY TOPIC WAS BROUGHT UP INITIALLY WITH THORN WAS THAT SOVIETS EXPECTED A NEGATIVE REACTION FROM JOBERT. JOBERT DID NOT DENY TO THORN THAT HE WOULD HAVE REACTED NEGATIVELY.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LUXEMB 00572 02 OF 02 021616Z

53

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AID-20 EB-11 NSC-10 RSC-01 CIEP-02

TRSE-00 SS-15 STR-08 OMB-01 CEA-02 L-03 H-03 PA-03

PRS-01 USIA-15 CIAE-00 COME-00 FRB-02 INR-10 NSAE-00

LAB-06 SIL-01 EA-11 IO-13 SAJ-01 XMB-07 OPIC-12 TAR-02

NIC-01 PM-07 NEA-10 MBFR-03 DODE-00 RSR-01 /208 W

----- 121449

R 021430Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3510

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS UNN

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 2 LUXEMBOURG 0572

8. HELMINGER ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION OVER THIS SOVIET INITIATIVE. DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDERSON HAS DENIED THAT HE WAS EVER APPROACHED ON THIS QUESTION. HELMINGER REASONED THAT GROMYKO MAY HAVE DESCRIBED INITIATIVE TO ANDERSON IN VAGUE TERMS OR THAT AT A TIME WHEN OTHER PEOPLE WERE AROUND AND ANDERSON WAS NOT GIVING FULL ATTENTION TO GROMYKO'S CONVERSATION. IN VIEW OF MANY OTHER POINTS RAISED AT FIRST STAGE OF CSCE. HELMINGER SPECULATED THAT ANDERSON MAY HAVE MISSED SIGNIFICANCE OF GROMYKO INITIATIVE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LUXEMB 00572 02 OF 02 021616Z

9. HELMINGER ADDED THAT LUXEMBOURGERS ASKED ROMANIAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW FOR THEIR VIEWS ON THIS INITIATIVE. ROMANIANS VERIFIED SOVIET STATEMENT THAT COMECON COUNTRIES HAD AGREED TO APPROACH EC THROUGH FADEYEV BUT DENIED SOVIET CONTENTION THAT GROMYKO HAD BEEN MANDATED TO FIRST EXPLORE MATTER WITH DANES. FARKAS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 02 AUG 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** hilburpw  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973LUXEMB00572  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS FARKAS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** LUXEMBOURG  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730862/aaaabtto.tel  
**Line Count:** 196  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 73 BRUSSELS 4290, COW 9047;  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** hilburpw  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 06 SEP 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <06-Sep-2001 by hilburpw>; APPROVED <10-Sep-2001 by hilburpw>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** COMECON-EC CONTACTS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, EC, LU, COMECON  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005